The Massacre in Herat
Imagine these headlines! "Nearly One Hundred Dead In Mistaken Bombing." Imagine three classrooms of young American children and a group of teachers were killed when their school was flattened by a mis-directed bomb. It is frightening to contemplate. Yet such a tragic event did occur in Afghanistan on August 22-23, 2008 where sixty innocent Afghan children and thirty adults were killed by coalition forces when US troops using faulty intelligence, bombed an inhabited compound in Herat province, Afghanistan mistakenly believing it was a Taliban stronghold. The story left me angry as should we all be at this tragic and unnecessary loss of life. Yet unfortunately we hear little in our press about this event and even less concerning the suggestion that it was caused by lax and careless battleground policies used by our forces as they target potential enemies.
On September 15, 2008, Newsday (War Update, September 15, 2008) reported, that the US military, after weeks of denial, finally agreed that a raid led by American forces had indeed killed 90 Afghan civilians, two-thirds of whom were children. The August 21-22 raid (See AP report, August 23, 2008) led by American Special Forces was first described as a successful attack on a "Taliban gathering" in which US-led forces killed "thirty militants" in the Shindad district of Herat province in Afghanistan. The initial report indicated that "after taking fire from the compound, coalition forces (justifiably and in self-defense) called in aerial bombardment which leveled the village" and according Lt. Nathan Perry, a US spokesperson, "thirty militants were killed and five were detained". In addition, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition were recovered. Furthermore, a US military spokeswoman, Lt Col. Rumi Neilsen-Green confirmed "a thorough assessment was done and that the coalition confirmed that it killed 30 militants including a Taliban leader Mulla Sidiq (or Mullah Siddiq) the supposed target of the attack.
Over the course of several days, additional information became available which varied with the initial official report. Furthermore, Afghan officials initiated their own inquiry when angry villagers demonstrated against coalition forces. During this period, US spokespeople continued to strongly defend their original characterization of events, until the Afghan government and a UN field-team produced actual photographics taken at the site. The US finally responded, by sending a one-star general to investigate.
The results of the investigations cause an unbiased reader to question many of the statements of the original report. In fact the new evidence clearly indicates no Taliban were killed or captured. Coalition forces were not fired on first. No "thorough" assessment of civilians killed was attempted. The initial attack by coalition forces was not a ground attack, but an aerial bombardment. The mysterious Mullah Siddiq was not present, captured or killed. Even more troubling was the revelation by Humayun Hamidzada, a spokesperson of Afghan President Karzai, that the victims were all the employees and their families of a British security firm! The terrible truth is we targeted and killed our own allies and their wives and children!
Furthermore, Hamidzada also revealed the finding that "false information" was provided to US forces which initiated the attack. The malfeasant informers were subsequently arrested by the Afghans and held in 'protective custody' by the Americans, they were revealed to be members of "a neighboring tribe', one of whom was actually identified by name as Nader Tawakil. The "evidence" of Taliban presence, in the form of recovered weapons, ammunition and particularly the maps of near-by allied bases were then not Taliban materials, but were attributable to the fact that the victims were employees of a British security firm.
Though the fact that the US led forces relied on faulty intelligence, if true, goes some way to explain the cause of the tragic event, but it also raises serious questions about our conduct on the battlefield. The investigation reveals that the attack was probably initiated as an aerial bombardment by US-led forces and only afterward, when the dust had settled, did US and allied forces enter the destroyed compound. The leveling and collapse of the flimsy mud-brick buildings would well-explain why only one-third of the victims (about thirty) were found by coalition troops. The reason: it is very likely that the women and children may have huddled in some interior area after the first wave of bombs fell and were thus more likely to have been buried in the rubble where their bodies remained unobserved and uncounted at first. The arms, ammo, maps and other paraphernalia, belongings of an allied security force, could easily be confused by soldiers unlettered and unsophisticated in the local culture and counted as evidence supportive of a "hit" on a Taliban meeting.
The US military dependence on aerial bombardment and questionable and unreliable informants to launch deadly force against targets where civilians are likely to be killed is patently unjustifiable. If this is our policy, a review is urgently needed. The US has regularly castigated others nations for using similar battleground tactics and we have at times characterized such behavior as 'war crimes'. Furthermore, these policies go counter to our stated policy aims of winning over the locals to our side (winning hearts and minds) and plays directly into the hands of the Taliban insurgency.
Addendum (Posted October 8, 2008) See NYT report: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08inquiry.html
About Me
- Bob Kalin
- Retired College Professor, Archaeologist
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